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Facial recognition technology adds a new dimension to government and police 
surveillance. If these organizations were to employ active surveillance using facial 
recognition technology, the implication could mean that people appearing in public 
places no longer have an expectation of privacy in anonymity. Real-time identification 
using facial recognition surveillance technology is not currently ready for successful 
employment by law enforcement or government agencies, but the speed with which the 
technology is being developed means that a constitutional challenge to this new 
technology will serve as a turning point for the future of Fourth Amendment privacy 
jurisprudence and shape the future of surveillance in the digital age.  
     This research explores the history and current state of facial recognition 
technology and examines the impacts of surveillance on privacy expectations. This thesis 
also reviews existing Fourth Amendment legal protections of privacy through a review of 
cases relating to government surveillance and privacy. The research effort finds that 
while facial recognition surveillance does not expressly violate current privacy 
protections, the courts have historically matured with advancing technology, and future 
court decisions are likely to decide soon whether the Fourth Amendment leans more 
toward safeguarding privacy or security when it comes to facial recognition surveillance. 
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In June 2001, in Ybor City, a suburb of Tampa, Florida, city administrators and 
police took part in a project that would divide the city on the issues of privacy and 
security. Using the already installed closed circuit television system in the downtown 
area, police installed a so-called “smart CCTV” system. The smart CCTV was unique 
because it used facial recognition technology and real-time surveillance footage to 
identify people, walking along the public streets in downtown Ybor City. For many 
residents, the smart CCTV system represented a scene right out of George Orwell’s 1984, 
where Big Brother watched every move of the citizens and privacy did not exist. To the 
police, it demonstrated an innovative approach to keeping the community secure by 
proactively embracing new technology. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Though the invasion of privacy in the home is the primary protection of the 
Fourth Amendment (Katz v. U.S.1), should the spirit of the Fourth Amendment be 
broadened to encompass the privacy of the identity of individuals in public? The 
competing interests of law enforcement professionals and privacy advocates provide an 
opportunity to study the increased use of technology in the field of surveillance, its 
effects on privacy expectations, and existing legal protections for people in public places. 
By considering public surveillance efforts currently in service, studying current privacy 
protections under the law, and reviewing public acceptance of surveillance technology, 
this thesis seeks to answer whether facial recognition surveillance violates Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections and to what extent, and whether law enforcement and 
government security professionals can use facial recognition surveillance for combatting 
crime while continuing to protect the public’s privacy expectations. 
1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Senator Al Franken, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy, 
Technology, and the Law, has “serious concerns about facial recognition technology 
(FRT) and how it might shape the future of privacy.” He points out in an open letter to 
Alan Tussy, the maker of NameTag, an app that uses FRT to scour the Internet for 
identifying information about the faces it scans, that facial recognition is unlike any 
biometric technology that has come before it:  
Unlike other biometric identifiers such as iris scans and fingerprints, facial 
recognition is designed to operate at a distance, without the knowledge or 
consent of the person being identified. Individuals cannot reasonably 
prevent themselves from being identified by cameras that could be 
anywhere-on a lamppost across the street, attached to an unmanned aerial 
vehicle, or, now, integrated into the eyewear of a stranger.2  
Senator Franken’s concerns are valid, and this thesis explores whether the law 
considers a person’s facial image as private or public when they show their face in public 
places, while also considering the ease with which modern technology can obtain 
identities.  
Government agencies employ different types of FRT. The FBI, for example, 
recently began a program that compares still-shot images with a facial image database. 
Technology such as that used in the Ybor City project used active surveillance and real-
time identification. There is a distinct difference when it comes to the privacy debate 
relating to active surveillance that is not present, or not as prevalent, when considering 
the comparison of still shots or frame captures. This thesis will explore the privacy issues 
that arise from the use of FRT with active surveillance cameras that identify suspects in 
real-time. 
The most recent controversy regarding facial recognition is the FBI’s Next 
Generation Identification (NGI) database, which builds on the fingerprint database that 
2 Al Franken to Kevin Alan Tussy, February 5, 2014, 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2699. 
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the FBI has maintained since 1924.3 The FBI has estimated that the database will contain 
52 million facial images in 2015.4 These images will be of the type and quality that 
investigators can search using facial matching of photos captured either by still camera or 
frames of CCTV shots. Lawmakers and the public should debate the question about who 
owns the rights to peoples’ facial images, the image takers, or the owners of the face, 
considering the growing database of facial images that government agents can search at 
the lightning-quick speed of technology. This debate is relevant because facial images are 
no longer just snapshots taken in public, but potentially roadmaps to a person’s identity. 
The advent of new technology like FRT brings a new paradigm to the debate 
about privacy and security because, until recently, people who displayed their faces in 
public relinquished a bit of privacy, but they still maintained a level of anonymity. With 
FRT, it is possible to identify people in public covertly and from a distance in real-time, 
thus negating the expectation of privacy through anonymity they once enjoyed.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Facial recognition technology is an evolving field and authors are frequently 
publishing new literature in the realm of facial recognition. This thesis captures the latest 
publications in the field and FRT relates to privacy. Literature regarding privacy and 
surveillance in the United States is extensive. This literature review includes relevant 
publications regarding employment of technology in the field of facial recognition, as 
well as publications related to privacy and surveillance-related privacy concerns.  
1. Current Use of Facial Recognition Technology 
Industrialized countries throughout the world are employing facial recognition 
technology on a limited basis. Canadians use facial recognition surveillance at racetracks 
and inside casinos to catch known cheaters, or for people with gambling addictions to 
3 Fingerprints and other Biometrics, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Accessed September 17, 
2014, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics. 
4 Mia De Graf and Mark Prigg, “FBI Facial Recognition Database that can Pick You Out from a 




                                                 
voluntarily sign up for a no-gambling list—using the technology as a kind of self-help 
program.5 The U.S. military uses facial recognition and other biometric information 
overseas to identify criminals and terrorists.6 Such other countries as Australia and Japan 
use facial recognition at border ports of entry for identifying visa fraud7 or speeding 
immigration lines.8 Police agencies in San Diego County, California, use facial 
recognition on handheld devices like smartphones for real-time identification of 
criminals.9  
Active facial recognition surveillance is rarely used. Police have tried using it 
inside the United States on a limited basis with little success. Kelly A. Gates points out 
that in the Ybor City Smart CCTV project, privacy formed a concern of the public: “In 
the case of Ybor City, civil liberties did have some resonance in public discourse about 
police adoption of the new surveillance technology…In fact, the conflict and controversy 
over the Smart CCTV project underscores a long-standing tension inherent in liberal 
governance between ‘the twin dangers of governing too much…and governing too 
little.’”10 More officially, Tampa Police spokesman Tom Durkin said, “Police 
discontinued using the system ‘because of the lack of arrests, not the privacy issues.’”11 
In fact, the Ybor City project failed to identify any criminals. The reason for the 
discontinued use of the system was based partly on what Gates says were “the successful 
5 “OLG and Commissioner Cavoukian Announce State-of-the-Art Privacy-Protective Facial 
Recognition system,” Privacy by Design, November 12, 2010, http://www.privacybydesign.ca/index.php/
olg-and-commissioner-cavoukian-announce-state-of-the-art-privacy-protective-facial-recognition-system/. 
6 Thom Shanker, “To Track Militants, U.S. Has System That Never Forgets a Face,” New York Times, 
July 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia 
/14identity.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
7 Samantha Maiden, “Biometric Security at Borders to Catch Visa Fraud,” The Daily Telegraph, April 
01, 2012, http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/biometric-security-at-borders-to-catch-visa-fraud/story-
e6freuy9-1226315240076?nk=25772438d874a12404ff8d05d585a121. 
8 “Test of Facial ID Recognition System Begins at Airports,” The Ashai Shimbun, August 07, 2012, 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201208070087. 
9 The Center for Investigative Reporting, “Police use Face Scans in the Field: Privacy Advocates are 
Concerned with the Military-grade Influx,” U-T San Diego, November 08, 2013, 
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/nov/08/cir-facial-recognition-software-san-diego/. 
10 Kelly A. Gates, Our Biometric Future: Facial Recognition Technology and the Culture of 
Surveillance (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 92. 
11 Ibid., 94. 
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efforts of vocal opponents to define automated facial recognition as a technology that 
gives the police too much power.”12 The police insisted they discontinued the use of the 
system when the free trial ran out because it failed to identify a single person. 
2. Understanding Privacy and Surveillance 
Significant literature exists regarding privacy, but scholars and authors have yet to 
agree on a narrow definition of the term. Wisconsin law professor Ken Gormley notes 
several leading “clusters” of privacy explanations in the past 100 years: 
Many scholars, dating back to Roscoe Pound in 1915, and Paul Freund in 
1975, have viewed privacy as an expression of one’s personality or 
personhood, focusing upon the right of the individual to define his or her 
essence as a human being. Second, closely akin to the “personhood” 
cluster, are those scholars such as Louis Henkin who have marked privacy 
within the boundaries of autonomy—the moral freedom of the individual to 
engage in his or her own thoughts, actions and decisions. A third cluster, 
typified by Alan Westin and Charles Fried, have seen privacy—at least in 
large part—in terms of citizens’ ability to regulate information about 
themselves, and thus control their relationships with other human beings, 
such that individuals have the right to decide “when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to others.” Finally, a 
fourth cluster of scholars have taken a more noncommittal, mix-and‑
match approach, breaking down privacy into two or three essential 
components, such as Ruth Gavison’s “secrecy, anonymity and solitude,” 
and the “repose, sanctuary and intimate decision.”13 
The fourth of Gormley’s clusters, the “non-committal” cluster, include themes 
also mentioned by Alan Westin in Privacy and Freedom. They are: solitude, intimacy, 
anonymity, and reserve.14 People generally practice solitude and intimacy in private, or 
in the home. On the other hand, people practice anonymity and, to a certain extent 
12 Ibid., 95. 
13 Ken Gormley, “One Hundred Years of Privacy,” Wisconsin Law Review 1335 (1992), Accessed 
December 1, 2014, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/
getDocCui?lni=3S41-1BM0-00CW-H07W&csi=270944,270077,11059,8411&hl= 
t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true/. 
14 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 7, 20–1, 31. 
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reserve, in public and are, therefore inevitably affected by public surveillance.15 Westin 
also examines the individual privacy themes and social processes that intrude on 
individual expectations of privacy, such as surveillance.16  
Westin points out that in order for the government to conduct surveillance with 
the consent of the public, the government must show more than the fact that surveillance 
can solve a particular social problem. He writes: “The need must be serious enough to 
overcome the very real and presently rising risk of jeopardizing the public’s confidence 
in its daily freedom from unreasonable invasions of privacy.”17  
Westin writes that one school of thought regarding surveillance is that monitoring 
our neighbors is society’s method of ensuring that everyone is following established 
laws.18 In a modern example, Kelly A. Gates credits Mark Andrejevic with the term, 
“lateral surveillance,” noting that when people on social networking sites post photos of 
themselves, they are simply exhibiting themselves. However, Gates writes, “browsing, 
searching, and identifying the photos of others is a way of watching over them, a form of 
what Andrejevic refers to as ‘peer-to-peer’ or ‘lateral-surveillance.’”19 
In her book, Taking Liberties: The War on Terror and the Erosion of American 
Democracy, Susan N. Herman, President of the American Civil Liberties Union, 
addresses specifically how privacy and democracy are inherently connected and the 
framers of the Constitution realized this fact. She points out that the Framers penned the 
Fourth Amendment with privacy specifically in mind and the government essentially 
lowered the Fourth Amendment barrier to intrusion after 9/11. Chapters in the Patriot 
15 Donald R. Zoufal, “Someone to Watch Over Me?: Privacy and Governance Strategies for CCTV 
and Emerging Surveillance Technologies” (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 35, 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA480074. 
16 Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 7, 20–1, 31. 
17 Ibid., 370. 
18 Ibid., 20. 
19 Gates, Our Biometric Future, 147. 
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Act, she notes, progressively shifted Fourth Amendment protections away from the 
framer’s intentions.20 
Carl Friedrich credits Immanuel Kant with claiming that any act done with 
intentional secrecy must mean that the foundation of the act lay in immorality.21 In large 
communities, such as an entire nation, the government assumes the task for monitoring 
peoples’ actions in the form of policing and security. Therefore, when a community 
member commits an act public, he is essentially declaring to the public, through their 
representative government, that his actions are legitimate and he has nothing to hide. 
Daniel Solove addresses the nothing-to-hide argument in his book, Nothing to Hide: The 
False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security. Essentially, Solove points out that the 
nothing-to-hide argument only speaks to some problems and not others. Within the face 
of the nothing-to-hide argument, a narrow focus of privacy is undertaken, but when 
focusing on privacy in the larger sense, say beyond surveillance and disclosure, the 
nothing-to-hide argument does not stand.22 Solove explains, “It represents a singular and 
narrow way of conceiving of privacy, and it wins by excluding consideration of the other 
problems often raised with government security measures.”23 Therefore, the notion 
privacy is much more complex than those who use the nothing-to-hide argument are 
generally prepared to discuss. The nothing-to-hide argument leaves many unanswered 
questions when faced with the entirety of privacy-related issues. 
American jurist Richard A. Posner tells us that people tend to exaggerate the 
harms from government surveillance and when comparing privacy values to security 
from a terrorism-related death, privacy should lose and security should win.24 Posner 
points out that while surveillance “imposes costs on innocent people because their 
20 Susan N. Herman, Taking Liberties: The War On Terror and the Erosion of American 
Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 111. 
21 Carl J. Friedrich, “Secrecy versus Privacy: The Democratic Dilemma,” in Privacy, ed. J. Roland 
Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1971), 106. 
22 Daniel J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2011), 32. 
23 Ibid., 32. 
24 Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 80. 
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privacy is compromised…the costs it imposes on terrorists are even steeper because it 
thwarts their plans utterly and places them at risk of capture or death.”25 When debating 
the privacy compromises associated with FRT and active surveillance, society must 
weigh the costs associated with foregoing anonymity in public versus the benefit of 
active crime prevention using the newest technology available. Judge Posner’s views 
show up closer to the side of crime prevention, and not public anonymity, when placed 
on the sliding scale of privacy versus security. 
The distinction between what is, or should be, public and what is, or should be, 
private compiles much of the debate surrounding privacy-defining case law. Protecting 
Americans’ privacy expectations has been a focus, particularly of legal scholars, since the 
late 19th century. Many authors cite Warren and Brandeis as among the first to write 
about “the right to privacy” in their 1890 article of the same name, published in the 
Harvard Law Review. In the article, they contend that the law should “protect those 
persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged 
into an undesirable and undesired publicity.”26 The Warren and Brandeis article focuses 
on the publication of peoples’ private affairs. It also addresses legal protections and 
options for redress. Warren and Brandeis explain when people make their private 
information public, they cannot claim an injury when someone else makes the same 
information public. One may draw a conclusion then, that when people show their faces 
in public, the law should not consider any reproduction of those images a violation of 
their privacy. 
3. Social Evolution and Facial Recognition Technology 
“Familiarity breeds acceptance.”27 These are the words of Susan N. Herman in 
her book, Taking Liberties: The War on Terror and the Erosion of American Democracy. 
Herman refers broadly to the security measures put in place after 9/11 that appear to 
25 Richard A. Posner, “Privacy, Surveillance, and Law,” The University of Chicago Law Review 75, 
no. 1 (2008): 246, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20141907. 
26 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 
(1890): 214, doi: 10.2307/1321160. 
27 Herman, Taking Liberties, 85. 
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bolster security at the expense of liberty, but which have not been shown to produce 
much good in the way of security. For having acquiesced to these measures, however, 
American society is now stuck with them, whether or not they work—and even if the 
threat abates. She writes, “Once we become accustomed to a new baseline, like bag 
searches or body scanners at the airport, those practices, like the idea of watchlists, are 
likely to proliferate.”28 She continues by saying that we continue to employ these tactics 
without knowing their effectiveness: “By the laws of inertia, these and other security 
programs are likely to continue into a second decade even though we have no way of 
knowing whether they are worthwhile.”29 Thus, the public’s familiarity with the security 
measures has bred an acceptance. Much in the same way that watchlists and body 
scanners have withstood the privacy advocates’ concerns, so will FRT likely breed 
acceptance. 
Kelly A. Gates notes that FRT is not a result of a post-9/11 world, as some would 
say. She claims that FRT is part of a natural progression of technology that would have 
come about regardless of 9/11. She explains that “according to the tech-neutrality view, 
pursuit of these technologies need not be understood as part of a particular security 
strategy, since they are products of the natural progression of science and technology, 
part of the inevitable unfolding process of computerization.”30 The employment of facial 
recognition surveillance is an inevitable progression of security technology. As people 
become more accustomed to the technology, it will be more accepted and more widely 
used. Just as Warren and Brandeis were concerned that photographs printed in the paper 
of people’s doings in public would ruin privacy by shouting their business from the 
rooftops seems ridiculous to us now, so will concerns about facial recognition 
surveillance seem ridiculous to the general public in the future. 
Some privacy advocates believe the potential for government abuse of 
surveillance technology exists and current privacy protections under the law do not allow 
for the use of technology like facial recognition surveillance. Law professor Susan 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Gates, Our Biometric Future, 197. 
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Freiwald writes, “The courts have…identified a four-factor test that identifies when a 
surveillance method intrudes on Fourth Amendment rights and requires heightened 
judicial oversight to protect against abuse.”31 The four-factor test of clandestine, 
intrusive, continuous, and indiscriminate surveillance requires that government agencies 
should obtain a warrant before using technology that would allow individual tracking. 
The warrant requirement reduces the opportunity for abuse by providing judicial 
oversight. It is clear, through an examination of case law, that many questions of privacy 
intrusions on the part of the government would never have come to light had a warrant 
application by the police, and issuance by a magistrate, occurred before the privacy 
injury. But it is through the lens of these cases that we begin to visualize a more precise 
indication of society’s privacy expectations. 
4. Constitutional and Legal Protections 
Although the word privacy does not appear in the Constitution, there is still legal 
protection for it. An examination of case law enforces this point. Privacy was described 
in United States v. Blok32 as “one of the unique values of our civilization.” Privacy exists 
not only in case law, but in the assumptions of most Americans. They believe they have 
privacy, therefore Americans must take privacy expectations into account when deciding 
how, or if, a privacy violation has occurred in a particular case. Although the word 
privacy does not appear in the Constitution, the expectations of privacy that Americans 
believe they possess comprise the core of most privacy-related jurisprudence.  
Privacy protections reside primarily in cases relating to the Fourth Amendment, 
which protects people and their homes from unwarranted search and seizure. The primary 
case involving the interpretation of privacy relating to the Fourth Amendment is Katz v. 
United States.33 In Katz, the F.B.I. placed a microphone and recording device on a 
telephone booth where they knew their suspect would likely later place a phone call to 
commit the crime of interstate wagering. It was determined in the Katz decision that a 
31 Susan Freiwald, “The Four Factor Test,” The Selected Works of Susan Freiwald, 2013, 
http://works.bepress.com/susan_freiwald/11. 
32 United States v. Blok, 188 F. 2d 1019 - Court of Appeals, Dist. of Columbia Circuit (1951). 
33 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public telephone booth and that 
technology, employed by the government without a warrant that “listens” to the 
conversation inside the booth, constitutes an illegal search, even if the device did not 
penetrate the interior of the space, because the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places. 
A public expectation of privacy also figured in Oliver v. United States,34 where 
police officers conducted a search of an open field. In Oliver, the court held that “human 
relations that create the need for privacy do not ordinarily take place in open fields.” One 
could argue the same for public monitoring using FRT. Courts have held that people have 
no expectation of privacy when it comes to being seen in public. 
Also at issue is the question of whether government surveillance for the purpose 
of national security is relevant to the privacy argument. The President of the United 
States is responsible under Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution, to “preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution of the United States.” This requirement implies a duty to protect 
against those who would illegally disrupt or overthrow the government. In U.S. v. U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan et al., known commonly as the Keith 
case, it was noted that, “the President–through the Attorney General – may find it 
necessary to employ electronic surveillance to obtain intelligence information on the 
plans of those who plot unlawful acts against the Government. The use of such 
surveillance in internal security cases has been sanctioned more or less continuously by 
various Presidents and Attorneys General since July 1946.”35  
In 1965, President Johnson appointed a Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, which was later named the “Crime Commission.” The Crime 
Commission found that the use of electronic surveillance by law enforcement was 
instrumental to thwarting organized crime: “The great majority of law enforcement 
officials believe that the evidence necessary to bring criminal sanctions to bear 
consistently on the higher echelons of organized crime will not be obtained without the 
34 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
35 United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan et al. (Plamondon 
et al., real parties in interest), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
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aid of electronic surveillance techniques. They maintain these techniques are 
indispensable to develop adequate strategic intelligence concerning organized crime, to 
set up specific investigations, to develop witnesses, to corroborate their testimony, and to 
serve as substitutes for them–each a necessary step in the evidence-gathering process in 
organized crime investigations and prosecutions.”36 The Keith case showed that while 
electronic surveillance was important for law enforcement officials in the protection of 
national security, the police must conduct intentional electronic surveillance directed at a 
specific person or persons with sufficient judicial oversight. That is, they must first obtain 
a warrant. 
Illinois v. Lidster37 is an important case relating to unwarranted and public 
surveillance. In the case, the police were conducting a traffic checkpoint to identify the 
suspect in a fatal hit and run accident. Lidster held that using surveillance to catch a 
suspect was more important than the privacy of the other people whom the police 
subjected to the surveillance. Judge Posner wrote, “Lidster is important because it 
divorces searching from suspicion. It allows surveillance that invades liberty and privacy 
to be conducted because of the importance of the information sought, even if it is not 
sought for use in a potential criminal proceeding against the people actually under 
surveillance.”38  
In Kyllo v. U.S.,39 the United States Supreme Court reviewed a case to decide 
whether the use of technology to peer into a person’s home constituted a search of the 
home. In the Kyllo case, police used a thermal imaging device from a public street to 
essentially see beyond the walls of a private residence and detect the amount of heat 
emanating from the residence to determine if heat lamps typically used for growing 
marijuana might be in use inside the home. 
An important aspect of the Kyllo case was that the use of thermal imaging 
technology was not revealing private acts in a private place, but simply a change in 
36 Ibid. 
37 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
38 Posner, Not a Suicide Pact, 91. 
39 Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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temperature from one part of the house to the next. The court found, however, that the 
Fourth Amendment protected any details, however slight, when obtained from the home 
using the new technology, and the police were required to obtain a search warrant.  
Another topic to note regarding Kyllo is the court distinguished that the public did 
not generally use thermal imaging technology, nor was it readily available for off-the-
shelf operation. When it comes to FRT, the public, for a large part, knowingly 
participates in employing and improving facial recognition. Kelly A. Gates points out in 
her book, Our Biometric Future: Facial Recognition Technology and the Culture of 
Surveillance, that the public uses the FRT provided by social networking sites such as 
Facebook to manage their personal photos.40  
The U.S. Supreme Court left a question unanswered in United States v. Knotts,41 
when deciding a case where the police tracked an electronic monitoring device inside a 
package without a warrant. The question left unanswered was whether monitoring the 
package, which the police could not track visually, constituted a search using technology. 
Facial recognition technology conducts the same investigation as, for example, a police 
officer on the street. At the beginning of a shift, if a police officer reviews photographs of 
wanted criminals before taking to the streets, he has in his head a database of faces from 
which to compare the people he sees in public. In the same way, FRT sees faces in public 
and either identifies them as a wanted criminal or not. The difference is that the camera 
and database of FRT are much more efficient than a police officer. This thesis will 
explore the question of whether the efficiency increase provided by technology violates 
privacy expectations of people in public. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The leading hypothesis of this thesis is that use of facial recognition surveillance 
by law enforcement agencies and government security specialists does not violate privacy 
protections under the Fourth Amendment. 
40 Gates, Our Biometric Future, 136–7. 
41 United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983). 
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There are existing legal protections for privacy. The law has considered and 
allowed public surveillance for many years.42 However, emerging technologies allow for 
massive surveillance, in real time, and also allow operators to save and access the results 
of the surveillance again at a later time. While emerging technology, such as facial 
recognition, presents an incredible opportunity for law enforcement and government 
security professionals to locate, track, and associate criminals and terrorists, the potential 
for abuse also exists. Privacy advocates recognize the potential for abuse and warn 
against the unrestricted use of FRT. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines existing protections under current U.S. law through case 
analyses and legal writings. Additionally, I examine circumstances where authors have 
debated emerging technology and privacy. This thesis contains an analysis of available 
works relating to advancing technology and the progression of social concerns through 
court interpretations. Also, I look at the acceptance of technology intruding into the 
individual and societal realms of privacy through an examination of existing peer-
reviewed works, published books, and relevant periodicals. I also compare the same 
privacy issues faced with the expanded use of what was another new technology, CCTV. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis begins with a non-technical overview of the technological 
advancement and use of FRT. I draw a distinction between active surveillance using FRT 
and using the technology for still shots taken from cameras. Next, this thesis studies the 
themes associated with privacy especially concerning surveillance. There are several 
privacy aspects to explore, but there are two in particular that relate to public 
surveillance, anonymity, and reserve. Surveillance of the public is not a new concept and 
there are existing laws governing surveillance methods and procedures. Finally, a 
thorough analysis of constitutional and legal protections is examined with regard to 
privacy and surveillance, both before and after the dawn of the digital age, and a 
42 Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveillance and the Fourth 
Amendment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 3.  
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determination is made as to whether Fourth Amendment privacy protections are violated 
by facial recognition surveillance.  
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II. OVERVIEW OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 
Facial recognition technology has been researched and employed on a limited 
basis inside the United States from around the mid- to late-20th century—with a poor 
record of success. The equipment and software required to successfully employ FRT has 
not been widely effective at providing the kinds of results that agencies and operators 
have desired from the technology. Research in the United States, aimed at programming 
computers for recognizing human faces, began with the military in the 1960s, but it was 
not until the 1990s that commercial interest took hold in the field of facial recognition.43 
Most people in the U.S. are accustomed to public monitoring for security 
reasons.44 Although there is an accepted level of monitoring people tolerate, the level of 
acceptance is predicated on anonymity. Author Kimberly Brown wrote, “People…expect 
to go about daily life in relative obscurity—unidentifiable to others they do not already 
know, do not care to know, or are not required to know—so long as they abide by the 
law.”45 Facial recognition technology has the potential for removing anonymity from 
public surveillance thus degrading the level of privacy people experience in public. 
FRT uses facial characteristics to identify and correlate such “nodal points” on a 
face as the eyes, nose, chin, cheekbones, etc. Software then compares these points to each 
other and compiles into a profile or faceprint. The software uses things like pores, 
wrinkles, and spots to further enhance the profile. The faceprints are stored in a database 
that the program can then search for matching profiles.46  
43 Gates, Our Biometric Future, 27. 
44 Dana Blanton, “Fox News Poll: Mixed views on NSA surveillance program,” Foxnews.com, June 
25, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/06/25/fox-news-poll-mixed-views-on-nsa-surveillance-
program/. 
45 Kimberly N. Brown, “Article: Anonymity, Faceprints, and the Constitution,” George Mason Law 
Review, Winter (2014): 2. 
46 Ibid. 
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FRT took a leap forward in the 21st century, especially after the attacks of 
September 11. Recent advances in real-time FRT surveillance appear promising, but 
researchers have labeled the technology as still inadequate for practical use.47  
A. EARLY HISTORY OF FRT 
The early beginnings of FRT trace back to the 1960s where both military and 
civilian scientists worked to create a technology that could prove useful on the battlefield. 
Scientists who originally conceived of the technology thought it could potentially, 
“identify, at a distance, specific individuals among the enemy ranks.”48 
Companies competed in the 1960s for computer-related research grants from the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Among the research areas was 
facial pattern recognition in photographs. The applicability of the emerging technology 
was not entirely defined, but Manuel De Landa wrote, “[T]he idea was not to transfer 
human skills to a machine, but to integrate humans and machines so that the intellectual 
skills of the former could be amplified by the latter.”49 
During the sixties, Panoramic Research Inc.’s co-founder Woodrow Wilson 
Bledsoe discovered the unique problems associated with FRT that still plague the FRT 
community today.50 Upon developing a facial recognition program that was heavily 
reliant on human interfacing, Bledsoe found that stock images used in facial recognition 
database searches must have a set of high-quality characteristics to produce a searchable 
product. Those important characteristics, which still hinder the advancement of FRT 
today, five decades later, are: “head rotation and tilt, lighting intensity and angle, facial 
expression, aging, etc.”51 
47 Charlie Savage, “Facial Scanning is Making Gains in Surveillance,” The New York Times, August 
21, 2013, accessed October 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/us/facial-scanning-is-making-
gains-in-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all. 
48 Gates, Our Biometric Future, 29. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 30. 
51 Ibid. 
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Gaining from the research conducted in the 1960s, scientists in the 1970s sought 
to take out the requirement for heavy human-interaction in detecting a facial form in 
photographs. A couple of advances by researchers at Stanford University in California, 
and Kyoto University in Japan, led to increased abilities for computer software to identify 
facial forms in photographs. The limited successes in the field of FRT through the mid-
1980s led scientists to focus on more limited goals rather than the coveted idea of real-
time identification that was the desired end-state from the original conception of the 
technology.52 
Until recently, scientists have struggled with the original set of problems faced by 
Bledsoe in the 1960s. For FRT to accurately identify a person, an amalgam of distinct 
characteristics needed to be present in a photograph. Those circumstances largely have 
not changed. Technological advancements in the fields of photography and videography, 
however have facilitated better opportunities for stock images, worthy of facial 
recognition, to appear in image databases.53 
B. RECENT ADVANCES IN FRT 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 demonstrated to the American public that although 
the end of the Cold War left the United States without a peer competitor in the realm of 
major military powers, the new enemies of the United States represented “asymmetric 
threats.” “Unidentifiable” enemies made the nation vulnerable. Gates recounts, “The 
United States may no longer have an enemy that could match its military might…but it 
now has more insidious enemies that do not play by the conventional rules of state 
warfare, and thus represent significant threats to the nation, disproportionate to their 
relatively minuscule military resources.”54 One idea became popular for identifying the 
new threats. It was something that America did very well: technological development. 
Information technology companies and security brokers went to work developing 
52 Gates, Our Biometric Future, 29–31. 
53 Federal Trade Commission, “FTC Recommends Best Practices for Companies That Use Facial 
Recognition Technologies,” October 22, 2012, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/10/ftc-
recommends-best-practices-companies-use-facial-recognition. 
54 Gates, Our Biometric Future, 99. 
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technologies that would assist the United States with identifying their new enemies. 
Gates explains:  
In the language of cultural studies, the aftermath of 9/11 was a moment of 
articulation, where objects or events that have no necessary connection 
come together and a new discursive formation is established: automated 
facial recognition as a homeland security technology, a means of 
automatically identifying the faces of “terrorists.” The interests of 
biometrics industry brokers to push their technologies after 9/11 translated 
well into the prevailing public policy and press response to the attacks: the 
frenzied turn to “security experts” to speculate as to the source of the 
security failures and to provide recommendations for “stopping the next 
one.”55  
Americans saw FRT as an opportunity to both play to their strengths in 
technological development and locate the elusive terrorists that were the target of their 
newest conflict. 
There was an American preoccupation with facial recognition after 9/11. The idea 
that FRT could identify terrorist suspects in public locations before they commit their 
crimes was the answer to the “asymmetric threats” and “unidentifiable enemies” 
problems. Visionics, an early developer of FRT, used 9/11 as a springboard for a funding 
campaign. Shortly after the attacks, Visionics claimed that the only obstacle to fully 
successful employment of FRT surveillance was federal funding.56 In fact, there were 
many competing biometrics industries vying for funding in the immediate post-9/11 
security problem-solving age.  
Lisa Nelson writes that the biometrics industry was fragmented and 
disorganized—it needed an overarching authority to bring organization coherency to the 
industry in order to focus efforts and work toward a more comprehensive security 
solution: “As quickly became clear, biometric technology encompasses myriad 
technologies, each with its own set of weaknesses. Instead of one coherent technology, 
the biometric industry was a series of industries within an industry.”57 She continues: 
55 Gates, Our Biometric Future, 100. 
56 Lisa S. Nelson, America Identified (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2011), 68. 
57 Ibid., 69. 
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“Certainly the lack of stability and coherence in the industry might have been endemic to 
any technology reaching technological maturity; however, these factors added to the issue 
for decision makers in the aftermath of September 11.”58 What the biometrics industry 
needed was a central organization from which to build cohesiveness—preferably one that 
already existed. 
A clear answer to the problem of a fractured biometrics collection and retention 
lay in the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS).59 The 
FBI had been collecting biometrics, such as fingerprints, for decades and the database 
presented a central location to store and access advances in biometric identifiers. More 
than a decade later, at a cost of many millions of dollars, the FBI now has a new system, 
called Next Generation Identification, acting as a repository for such biometric 
information as fingerprints, iris scans, palm prints, tattoos, and faceprints.60  
The FBI’s Next Generation Identification (NGI) database contains approximately 
400 million facial images.61 Ten states have granted the FBI access to their driver’s 
license and state identification card photograph databases.62 Thirty-seven states are using 
FRT for investigations that take minutes now compared to what may have taken hundreds 
of hours to manually complete.63 Some investigators are able to access FRT databases in 
the field via their patrol car data terminals or even smart phones.64 Investigations using 
this type of FRT are worrying to some privacy advocates because of the information 
sharing and speed with which investigations can take place. However, more troubling to 
privacy advocates than photograph database access is the immediate identification of 
people in public places using active facial recognition surveillance. 
58 Nelson, America Identified, 69. 
59 Ibid., 71. 
60 The FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Next Generation Identification,” accessed November 15, 
2014, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi. 
61 Brown, “Anonymity,” 8. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ali Winston, “Facial recognition, once a battlefield tool, lands in San Diego County,” The Center 
for Investigative Reporting, November 7, 2013, accessed November 19, 2013, http://cironline.org/reports/
facial-recognition-once-battlefield-tool-lands-san-diego-county-5502#. 
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To date, the system nearest to being able to identify faces in a crowd using real-
time surveillance is the Biometric Optical Surveillance System (BOSS). Developed 
through funding from the Department of Homeland Security, BOSS is still in production 
and testing, but according to a recent article by Ginger McCall in The New York Times, 
“The BOSS, if completed, will use video cameras to scan people in public (or will be fed 
images of people from other sources) and then identify individuals by their faces, 
presumably by cross-referencing databases of driver’s license photos, mug shots or other 
facial images cataloged by name.”65  
The BOSS technology is quite powerful and evokes emotions in people 
reminiscent of the mass surveillance experienced by the Orwellian society of Oceania in 
the book 1984, where Big Brother was potentially watching every move, made by 
anyone, at any time.66 One difference between Oceania in 1984, and the BOSS, is that 
images and associated locations may be stored for access in later investigations. This 
invites what some have called potential abuses. McCall writes: “While this sort of 
technology may have benefits for law enforcement (recall that the suspects in the Boston 
Marathon bombings were identified with help from camera footage), it also invites abuse. 
Imagine how easy it would be, in a society increasingly videotaped and monitored on 
closed-circuit television, for the authorities to identify antiwar protesters or Tea Party 
marchers and open dossiers on them, or for officials to track the public movements of ex-
lovers or rivals. ‘Mission creep’ often turns crime-fighting programs into instruments of 
abuse.”67 For example, mission creep would be to use the data obtained by BOSS in a 
way that employing agency had not originally intended or sanctioned. Mission creep and 
data security are of particular concern to those who would not normally consider 
themselves targets of police investigations. 
Facial recognition technology has the potential to greatly enhance policing and 
government security efficiency in the United States. The advancement of FRT could 
65 Ginger McCall, “The Face Scan Arrives,” The New York Times, August 30, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/opinion/the-face-scan-arrives.html?_r=0. 
66 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949), 5. 
67 McCall, “The Face Scan Arrives.” 
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potentially accomplish in seconds what would take hundreds or thousands of man-hours 
to complete manually. The decades-long development of FRT is coming to a point where, 
in the near future, personal information about people can be so quickly accessed that their 
identity, location, and other personal information can be determined and logged within 
seconds. This technology, if left unregulated by law, should be particularly troubling to 
those who have no reason to be concerned with law enforcement surveillance. 
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III. PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE 
Facial recognition technology contributes to an Orwellian society that many fear 
is transforming through technological advances in surveillance. Technological 
advancement of facial recognition technology bridged with uploaded photos on social 
networking, driver’s licenses, unmanned aerial drones, public surveillance cameras, and 
police body-cameras threatens anonymity. All of these surveillance databases combined 
with the FBI’s NGI, and other bits and bytes available in the public domain, can create an 
intimate profile of the daily life of a person who believes they are remaining anonymous 
in public.68 
Privacy advocates are concerned with the unwitting, or unwilling, participation in 
privacy-invading activities that facial recognition forces on people appearing in public. 
As Senator Franken pointed out, FRT does not allow a person to actively participate in 
monitoring or identification.69 Privacy and surveillance are at odds when linked with 
FRT and current protections under the law.  
A. PRIVACY 
Active surveillance in public using facial recognition technology can serve to 
degrade anonymity and reserve, thus robbing individuals of the comfort associated with 
maintaining their personal privacy. The desire to remain anonymous to the government 
has a history dating back to the Founding.70 The advent of technologies, such as FRT, 
has eroded the ability of Americans to remain anonymous and creates the possibility of 
future harms.71 The themes of anonymity and reserve are most important when 
examining the effects of surveillance technology on privacy in modern America because 
they deal with individuals’ interactions within society.72  
68 Brown, “Anonymity,” 2. 
69 Al Franken to Kevin Alan Tussy, February 5, 2014, 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2699. 
70 Brown, “Anonymity,” 2. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 31–2. 
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1. Anonymity 
Anonymity is “when the individual is in public places or performing public acts 
but still seeks, and finds, freedom from identification and surveillance.”73 A person in 
public, “does not expect to be personally identified and held to the full rules of behavior 
and role that would operate if he were known to those observing him. In this state the 
individual is able to merge into the ‘situational landscape.’”74 The employment of FRT 
by government security agencies and police may have a profound effect on the condition 
of anonymity because a person being watched by FRT is not only under surveillance in 
public, potentially without their knowledge or consent, but they are also subject to 
identification without their knowledge or consent.  
People act and feel differently in public when they know they will remain 
anonymous. Removing the feeling of anonymity “destroys the sense of relaxation and 
freedom that men seek in open spaces and public arenas.”75 This destruction of peace is 
the first of three harms associated with compromised anonymity according to author 
Kimberly Brown in the George Mason Law Review:76 adverse influence on behavior, 
emotional harm, and reduced accountability for the watchers. People experience 
emotional harm, as described by Westin, when the knowledge of surveillance destroys 
“relaxation and freedom.” People experience stress and the inability to relax. The result 
of monitoring can affect their social interactions.77 
Self-regulating behavior, in the form of censorship, can develop, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily, as a result of surveillance.78 There exists a possibility for 
abuse through manipulation and controlling peoples’ behavior through the social norms 




76 Brown, “Anonymity,” 10. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Brown, “Anonymity,” 10. 
79 Ibid. 
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can lead people in a democratic society to forego objecting to policies with which they 
disagree. Brown notes, “The pressures of having one’s private scandals ‘outed’ can push 
people toward socially influenced courses of action that without public disclosure and 
discussion, would never happen. They are less willing to voice controversial ideas or 
associate with fringe groups for fear of bias or reprisal.”80 
Modern surveillance, such as FRT, involves creating massive databases and 
reduces privacy security. Massive searchable databases create the “aggregation effect,” 
according to Daniel J. Solove.81 In effect, data about a person that is available with 
minimal effort through the use of computer searches makes the compilation of that data 
“vastly more than the sum of its parts.”82 Solove demonstrates the aggregation effect by 
comparing it with the pointillism paintings of Seurat. “Similar to a Seurat painting, where 
a multitude of dots juxtaposed together form a picture, bits of information when 
aggregated paint a portrait of a person.”83 
When a person is unknowingly subjected to FRT, their faceprint is combined with 
other data about them, thus revealing new information about which the subject has no 
knowledge or control over. This could be particularly troubling if the FRT operator uses 
the information in a negative way. Brown adds, “The party doing the aggregating gains a 
powerful tool for forming and disseminating personal judgments that render the subject 
vulnerable to public humiliation and other tangible harms, including criminal 
investigation.”84 
2. Reserve 
Reserve, according to Westin’s themes, is the fourth state of privacy. It is the 
ability for discretion where a person decides what they want to share with others and 
80 Brown, “Anonymity,”10 (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 2117, 2122 (2001). 
81Solove, Digital Person, 44. 
82 Solove, Digital Person, 44 (quoting Julie E. Cohen, “DRM and Privacy,” 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J., 
575–585 (2003).  
83 Solove, Digital Person, 44. 
84 Brown, “Anonymity,” 10. 
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what they want to keep for themselves. Reserve was first established around the turn of 
the 20th century, when Warren and Brandeis penned their Harvard Law Review article 
stating that the information to be shared about a person should be under that person’s 
control, and the subject should retain the “right to be let alone.” Gormley references 
Professor Hyman Gross in explaining the importance and personal nature reserve has on 
privacy: 
It is through this delicate process of “editorial privilege” that we 
establish our identities in a social setting, thus maintaining control over 
how society views us: as parents, brothers and sisters, employers, 
employees, neighbors, citizens, all of the different roles and perceptions 
which collectively establish our identity, and individuality, within a 
modern American democracy. As a legally protected right, the original 
species of privacy introduced by Warren and Brandeis can be defined as 
the “right to be let alone, with respect to the acquisition and dissemination 
of information concerning the person, particularly through unauthorized 
publication, photography, or media.”85 
Reserve is important in personal relationships, but reserve also has a function in 
public. Westin notes: “The manner in which individuals claim reserve, and the extent to 
which it is respected or disregarded by others, is at the heart of securing meaningful 
privacy in the crowded, organization-dominated settings of modern industrial society and 
urban life.”86  
Keeping identities and personal information and about one’s activities away from 
the public are important privacy concerns affected by employing FRT. Westin wrote that 
in order for a community to accept surveillance, the need for surveillance, “must be 
serious enough to overcome the very real and presently rising risk of jeopardizing the 
public’s confidence in its daily freedom from unreasonable invasions of privacy.”87  
85 Gormley, “One Hundred Years.” 
86 Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 32. 
87 Ibid., 370. 
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B. SURVEILLANCE 
Simply put, surveillance is monitoring people for the possibility of social 
intervention.88 Public and private organizations are increasingly installing surveillance 
cameras for deterrence and/or investigative purposes.89 But passive surveillance systems 
can be improved by identifying the people they are recording and, hopefully, identifying 
a threat before a crime is committed. Facial recognition technology makes this 
improvement possible. 
David Murakami Wood gave an important and comprehensive definition of 
surveillance in A Report on the Surveillance Society, to the United Kingdom’s 
Information Commissioner in 2006. Wood stated that rather than using a government-
generated definition for surveillance, a detailed look at the process is necessary: “Where 
we find purposeful, routine, systematic and focused attention paid to personal details, for 
the sake of control, entitlement, management, influence or protection, we are looking at 
surveillance.”90 
Wood introduces the important notion that surveillance is not simply watching 
and recording, but making identifications and using the information gathered. Facial 
recognition surveillance provides the identification piece of surveillance introduced by 
Wood. The identification of individuals by their face and how that information is, or will 
be, used is a concern of privacy advocates. 
The widespread proliferation of video surveillance devices and people’s 
uninhibited sharing of personal information through social media have created a culture 
of acceptance for potentially privacy-violating technology to be employed by government 
agencies and the longer this unchecked theme continues, the harder it will become for 
privacy advocates to justifiably call for intervention. The enhanced information sharing 
88 Sean P. Hier and Josh Greenberg, Surveillance: Power, Problems, and Politics (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2009), ix. 
89 Roy Coleman and Michael McCahill, Surveillance and Crime (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications Ltd., 2011), 98. 
90 David Murakami Wood, ed., “A Report on the Surveillance Society: Full Report,” Report for the 




                                                 
between government agencies and voluntary mass-oversharing of the unsuspecting public 
combine systems and information to create a vulnerability for a “totalitarian repression” 
as described by Hier and Greenberg: 
No government—totalitarian or broadly democratic—has ever had at its 
fingertips the surveillance infrastructure capacity that is unwittingly being 
created by the countless localized decisions to augment visibility. As the 
public has become inured to repeated warnings about “Big Brother,” and 
seduced by the assorted abilities of new surveillance technologies, what 
prospect is there to champion a political effort to foreground the prospects 
of unequalled totalitarian repression that lies dormant within emergent 
surveillance structures?91 
Reginald Whitaker, who coined the term Little Brother—referring to government 
control and censoring of the Internet—recognized the potential danger in turning over too 
much information-controlling power to the government.92 This cry went out in 1999, 
before the advent of social networking, selfies, and mass Internet over-sharing. Sixteen 
years of increasingly revealing personal information sharing online has led to an 
increased capacity for government surveillance, but we have yet to see wide-spread 
totalitarian repression as postulated by Hier and Greenberg.  
Government agencies frequently use surveillance to preempt danger. Some are 
concerned that, if left unchecked, governments will use preemption to justify mass 
surveillance where everyone is watched all the time.93 Maureen Webb notes in her book, 
Illusions of Security: Global Surveillance and Democracy in the Post-9/11 World, that 
the G-8 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and 
United States) have established a global infrastructure for mass registration and 
surveillance of entire populations. They consist of various initiatives that, when viewed 
collectively seem to, “aim to ensure that almost everyone on the planet is ‘registered,’ 
that all travel is tracked globally, that all electronic communications and transactions are 
monitored or accessible to the state, and that all information collected about individuals 
91 Hier and Greenberg, Power, Problems, and Politics, xviii. 
92 Reginald Whitaker, The End of Privacy: How Total Surveillance Is Becoming a Reality (New York: 
New Press, 1999), 111–5. 
93 Maureen Webb, Illusions of Security: Global Surveillance and Democracy in the Post-9/11 
World (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2007), 69. 
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in public and private sector databases is stored, linked, data-mined, and made available to 
state agents.”94  
1. Panopticon 
This type of mass surveillance monitoring, without overt public knowledge or 
consent, smacks of Bentham’s Panopticon. Actually, the idea owes as much to Michel 
Foucault, who re-introduced Bentham’s Panopticon in his book Discipline and Punish, in 
1977. Bentham wrote about the Panopticon more than a century earlier, but it was 
Foucault’s origination of panopticism that brought Bentham’s Panopticon to the attention 
of more than just philosophy, history, and political science scholars.95 A Panopticon is a 
surveillance design where the watcher has the capability, and presents the illusion, of 
watching multiple subjects at any or all times without the subjects knowing they are 
being watched. Foucault describes Bentham’s Panopticon and the major effect: 
The major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning 
of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its 
effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power 
should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural 
apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power 
relation… [such that] the inmates should be caught up in a power situation 
of which they are themselves the bearers. In view of this, Bentham laid 
down the principle that power should be visible and unverifiable…in the 
peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central 
tower, one sees everything without ever being seen.96 
Americans know that their public appearances are subject to video recording 
through closed circuit cameras, mobile phones, and other such devices carried by people 
in public who are filming their own activities. Most surveillance devices are used by 
94 Ibid.,71. 
95 Anne Brunon-Ernst, Beyond Foucault: New Perspectives On Bentham’s Panopticon (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2012), xi. 
96 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1977), 201–2. 
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landowners and employers for security purposes to avoid claims of negligence.97 Even 
with the myriad recording devices used in public, people still retain a bit of anonymity 
and can feel relatively sure that, for the most part, the surveillance to which they are 
being subjected is not active surveillance in the sense that panopticism is not taking 
place. Facial recognition technology like the Department of Homeland Security’s BOSS, 
however, degrades privacy by identifying individuals instantly and removing the privacy 
of anonymity. The government uses facial recognition technology to increase security 
through surveillance, but employing FRT may actually increase insecurity through 
societal transformation.98 
Using FRT and active surveillance for a comprehensive documentation of 
peoples’ locations and activities is a violation of privacy as described by Westin and 
Fried in Gormley’s third and fourth privacy clusters. Donald Zoufal wrote in his 2008 
master’s thesis, “Someone to Watch over Me? Privacy and Governance Strategies for 
CCTV and Emerging Surveillance Technologies”: 
With the advent of digitization technology, that allows for the cataloguing 
and compiling of massive amounts of data, it is this documentation feature 
of the Panopticon that can dramatically shift power between the individual 
and his or her government. The ultimate effect of this compilation of data 
that allows the subsequent manipulation of the individual is not known. 
However, the dramatic shift in power between the individual and 
government needs to be recognized.99 
Indeed, society must recognize the power afforded to the government by the 
employment of active facial recognition surveillance and congress must pass legislation 
to appropriately govern future surveillance technologies. The outlook for panopticism is 
not entirely negative. Strictly speaking, the Panopticon was a structural design allowing 
97 Robert D. Bickel, Susan Brinkley, and Wendy White, “Seeing Past Privacy: Will the Development 
and Application of CCTV and Other Video Security Technology Compromise an Essential Constitutional 




98 Mitchell Gray, “Urban Surveillance and Panopticism: Will We Recognize the Facial Recognition 
Society?,” Surveillance and Society 1 (3) (2003), 314–330, http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/
articles1%283%29/facial.pdf. 
99 Zoufal, “Someone to Watch,” 45. 
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total observation and documentation. However, there are features of the Panopticon that 
allow the watchers to oversee and regulate to without interrupting the operations of the 
Panopticon. For instance, Foucault points out: 
The arrangement of this machine is such that its enclosed nature does not 
preclude a permanent presence from the outside: we have seen that anyone 
may come and exercise in the central tower the functions of surveillance, 
and…he can gain a clear idea of the way in which the surveillance is being 
practiced. In fact, any panoptic institution…may without difficulty be 
subjected to such irregular and constant inspections: and not only by the 
appointed inspectors, but also by the public…The seeing machine was 
once a sort of dark room into which individuals spied; it has become a 
transparent building in which the exercise of power may be supervised by 
society as a whole.100 
Using panopticism example, the public can be protected from abuse and 
overreaching by government surveillance through frequent and unannounced inspections 
and openness in surveillance programs. Transparency allows for the public and inspectors 
to ensure that government agencies are properly observing the public’s wishes, applying 
requisite laws and policies, and maintaining the appropriate level of privacy. 
2. Surveillance and Behavior 
Surveillance seeks to solve security problems through preemption, but brings with 
it a new set of problems to consider. Coupling facial recognition and surveillance calls 
for new laws to protect privacy. As Senator Franken noted at a 2012 Senate hearing titled 
What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties, a concern 
exists among Americans that surveillance aided by facial recognition technology may, 
“eventually come at a very high cost to our civil liberties.”101 He then introduces the 
concerns of law: 
Unlike what we have in place for wiretaps and other surveillance devices, 
there is no law regulating law enforcement use of facial recognition 
100 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 207. 
101 Al Franken, Senator, United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Privacy, 
Technology and the Law, What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties: 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Privacy, Technology and the Law of the Committee On the Judiciary, 
United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, July 18, 2012 (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2012). 
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technology. And current Fourth Amendment case law generally says that 
we have no reasonable expectation of privacy in what we voluntarily 
expose to the public—yet we can hardly leave our houses in the morning 
without exposing our faces to the public. So law enforcement doesn’t need 
a warrant to use this technology on someone. It might not even need to 
have a reasonable suspicion that the subject has been involved in a 
crime.102 
One solution to Senator Franken’s concerns about unknowingly participating in 
active surveillance is posting signs everywhere that inform potential participants that 
facial recognition technology is in use. Similar to the “Smile. You’re on camera” signs 
that retail shops popularly post in the United States, FRT warning signs would serve to 
create panopticism and modify the behavior of the people who read the signs. When 
people under surveillance in a democratic society are not aware of the surveillance, there 
is no transparency in their democracy and they run a risk of developing totalitarianism, or 
at least run the risk of privacy-demeaning mission creep. 
There are panoptic effects of people who know they are under surveillance in 
public. The resulting social control is dangerous and compounds with advanced 
technology. Jeffrey Reiman writes about this phenomenon: 
When you know you are being observed, you naturally identify with the 
outside observer’s viewpoint, and add that alongside your own viewpoint 
on your action. This double vision makes your act different, whether the 
act is making love or taking a drive. The targets of the panopticon know 
and feel the eye of the guard on them, making their actions different than 
if they were done in private. Their repertoire of possible actions 
diminishes as they lose those choices whose intrinsic nature depends on 
privacy.103 
Reiman’s “double vision” is more likely when a subject knows their actions are 
being recorded. Richard Wasserstrom notes that people who know data is being collected 
on them measure their actions more carefully:  
102 Franken, What Facial Recognition Technology Means. 
103 Jeffrey H. Reiman, “Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to 
Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future,” Santa Clara Computer and High Technology 
Law Journal 11, no. 1 (1995), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol11/iss1/5. 
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No matter how innocent one’s intentions and actions at any given moment, 
I think that an inevitable consequence of such a practice of data collection 
would be that persons would think more carefully before they did things 
that would become part of the record. Life would to this degree become 
less spontaneous and more measured.104 
Public surveillance is a fantastic tool for security and investigations, but in a free 
and open society, it is a hindrance to ordinary behavior. A society that promotes freedom 
of action should not employ devices that alter people’s behavior. As Christopher 
Slobogin notes:  
People who know they are under government surveillance will act less 
spontaneously, more deliberately, less individualistically, and more 
conventionally; conduct on the streets that is outside the mainstream, 
susceptible to suspicious interpretation, or merely conspicuous…will 
diminish and perhaps even be officially squelched.105  
A free society must allow its people to act freely and possess the feeling of 
security provided by remaining anonymous in public. When people feel like the 
authorities are constantly identifying and monitoring their actions in public, panoptic 
effects abound and social control thrives.  
104 Richard A. Wasserstrom, “Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions,” in Philosophical 
Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, ed. Ferdinand D. Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), 328. 
105 Christopher Slobogin, “Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to 
Anonymity,” Mississippi Law Journal 72, no. 1 (2002), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.364600. 
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IV. PRIVACY, SURVEILLANCE, AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
There is no constitutional protection against unregulated, omnipresent monitoring 
of the public by government security agencies. When asked about the CIA’s 
responsibilities to privacy and civil liberties, General Michael Hayden, the Director of the 
CIA at the time, who often liked to use sports analogies, famously quipped that when it 
came to civil liberties and intelligence tasks, he would always stay in fair territory, but it 
was his duty to play right up to the line. Specifically, he said, he would play fair, but 
there would be chalk dust on his cleats.106 In other words, it is the responsibility of 
government security agencies to push the envelope of civil liberties using every effort to 
provide security.  
Facial recognition technology pushes the privacy envelope and the 
implementation of active identification through surveillance using FRT is a development 
in the privacy-versus-security debate that society should explore. It is the responsibility 
of lawmakers to pass legislation to protect civil liberties and keep the “chalk line” in an 
appropriate location to allow government security agencies and police to conduct 
efficient surveillance and still protect Americans’ privacy expectations under the law. 
In 1890, in the Harvard Law Review, Warren and Brandeis announced two 
important points regarding personal privacy.107 The first was that times were changing 
and the rules associated with defining and protecting privacy must take societal (and 
technological) changes into consideration. The second was that the “right to be let alone,” 
as Judge Cooley paraphrased it, extended to people even outside of their home.108 The 
article is closely associated with the 1928 Olmstead decision and the 1967 Katz decision. 
From these writings and early court cases, we can see how Americans are developing 
their expectations of privacy. 
106 Michael V. Hayden, “CIA Director’s Address at Duquesne University Commencement,” Central 
Intelligence Agency, May 4, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2007/cia-
directors-address-at-duquesne-university-commencement.html. 
107 Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy.”  
108 Ibid. 
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At the heart of most privacy cases is the distinction between what societies 
consider private and what they consider public.109 Historically speaking, ancient biblical 
texts and Greek and Roman law were the underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution—where a man’s home was his castle.110 There is a strong 
foundation in U.S. case law that establishes the home as the center of privacy, and no 
one, including agents of the government, may violate that privacy without a reasonable 
cause. The issue with facial recognition technology does not currently affect privacy in 
the home, so one must look farther from the home to determine if FRT violates privacy 
expectations. 
The Fourth Amendment protects people and their possessions against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.111 The use of facial recognition technology by police 
and government security agencies is not a violation of privacy guarantees under the 
Fourth Amendment. Rather, a limited right to privacy has been established by the United 
States Supreme Court as a “penumbral right,” a right guaranteed through implication, in a 
series of cases that this chapter will examine.112 This chapter will explore relevant 
legislation and jurisprudence on the issues of privacy, surveillance, technology, and 
applications of the law relating to facial recognition surveillance. 
 
A. EARLY COURT INTERPRETATIONS  
The early traditional method of determining whether a given search violated the 
Fourth Amendment relied on the tort of trespass. This method of determining a search 
violation hails from the time when the nation first adopted the Fourth Amendment. The 
violation occurred with “a physical intrusion on private property.”113 Many cases since 
109 Turkington, “Privacy Law,” 2. 
110 Nelson Lasson, “The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution,” in Privacy Law: Cases and Materials, by Richard C. Turkington and Anita L. Allen (St. 
Paul, MN: West Group, 2002) 7–8. 
111 U.S. Const., amend. IV. 
112 Turkington, “Privacy Law,” 63. 
113 Brown, “Anonymity,” 11. 
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the late 19th century have found this literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to be 
out of date and not in keeping with the spirit of the Constitutional framers’ intent 
regarding protection against unreasonable search and seizure. 
Supreme Court decisions often cite Boyd v. United States114 as a landmark case 
that demonstrated no physical intrusion need have occurred to violate protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure as protected by the Fourth Amendment. In Boyd, the 
court found that the government could not compel a defendant to produce papers that 
would incriminate him in court. While this case touches on the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection against self-incrimination, the signal holding relates to the Fourth 
Amendment.115 Kimberly Brown wrote that the framers of the Constitution were aware 
of the “arbitrary powers” the government could possess, and it was against this danger 
that they were guarding when they wrote the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: 
In refusing to uphold a court order directing a defendant in a civil 
forfeiture proceeding to produce documentary evidence of liability, the 
court framed the “essence” of the government’s offense as “the invasion 
of the indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private 
property,” as the framers were keenly attuned to “the struggles against 
arbitrary power in which they had been engaged for more than 20 years” 
when they approved the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.116 
In Olmstead v. United States,117 the majority based its decision on the fact that a 
physical intrusion had not occurred, and therefore the government had not violated the 
Fourth Amendment: 
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions 
brought to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated 
as against a defendant unless there has been an official search and seizure 
of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material 
effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house “or curtilage” for the 
purpose of making a seizure.118 
114 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
115 U.S. Const., amend. V. 
116 Brown, “Anonymity,” 12. 
117 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
118 Ibid. 
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The Olmstead opinion was based on the original tort laws against trespass. Louis 
Brandeis famously dissented from the majority’s judgment in Olmstead by claiming that 
wiretapping did violate the Fourth Amendment even though a physical trespass had not 
occurred and he cited Boyd, among others, to prove the violation. The advancement of 
technology had allowed the government to intrude on the essence of a man’s privacy 
expectations in a way that the framers of the Constitution could not have imagined:  
The makers of our Constitution…knew that only a part of the pain, 
pleasure, and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They 
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, 
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right 
to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion 
by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.119 
In the Katz decision, Justice Harlan concurred with the majority opinion of the 
court that electronic eavesdropping requires a warrant, but he qualified his opinion in 
what several more recent court cases refer to as the Harlan elaboration.120 In it, Justice 
Harlan explains that the Katz decision protects people and not places. Therefore, the case 
established that even outside the home, people have some expectation of privacy. 
Additionally, the Harlan elaboration noted that in order for a breach of privacy to occur, 
the situation must pass a two-part test; namely, “a person [must] have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy,”121 and, “the expectation [must] be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”122  
When relating the Harlan elaboration to facial recognition technology, one can 
observe that people in public fail the first part of the two-part test. That is, they do not 
exhibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy. People displaying their faces in public 
are, in effect, declaring that they are prepared to accept that others will see their faces and 
119 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 




                                                 
therefore they are not demonstrating a desire for privacy, at least to the image of their 
face.  
Justice Harlan’s first test, demonstrating a subjective expectation of privacy, is 
easy for government agencies to overcome; the courts should not consider it a hard-and-
fast rule. La Fave demonstrates why: 
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a 
statement of what Katz held or in theory of what the Fourth Amendment 
protects. It can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an 
individual’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. If it could, the 
government could diminish each person’s subjective expectation of 
privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that we were all 
forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance.123 
The New York Law Review in 1968 referred to the Katz decision as a “watershed” 
moment in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because, “the court purported to clean 
house on outmoded fourth amendment principles.”124 Government electronic 
surveillance no longer needed to pass the trespass or property-based test. Instead, in Katz, 
the court found that Brandeis’ “right to be let alone” was the test for Fourth Amendment 
privacy protections and various courts have repeated this decision many times since 
Katz.125 
Although Katz represented a turning point in privacy jurisprudence, the decision 
did not provide privacy protection for technology like FRT. The Katz decision noted that 
“what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”126 Further, in New York v. Class,127 the court 
found that since “the exterior of a car…is thrust into the public eye…to examine it does 
not constitute a search.”128 The court also found that there is no reasonable expectation of 
123 La Fave, Search and Seizure, 583. 
124 Ibid., 580. 
125 Brown, “Anonymity,” 12. 
126 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
127 New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986). 
128 Ibid. 
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privacy associated with the movements of a person travelling in a vehicle on public 
thoroughfares.129  
A reasonable conclusion to draw from these pre-digital–age legal decisions is that 
the courts have shown that a person knowingly exposing their face in public and, while 
moving about in the public eye, has no reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes 
to their faceprint being collected and used to identify them. The courts have held that 
“mere visual observation does not constitute a search.”130  
Douglas A. Fretty, a corporate lawyer in California, points out that the argument 
in favor of government surveillance is strong, “that where people lack an expectation of 
not being observed, they equally lack an expectation of not being recognized.”131 Put 
another way, if people know they may be observed in public, then they can reasonably 
expect they may be identified. Kimberly Brown writes that face scanning in public is no 
different than the visual observation society expects of a police officer in the regular 
course of his duties on patrol: 
To the extent that FRT is considered part and parcel of the traditional 
visual surveillance that police conduct in unmarked vehicles—which has 
long been considered constitutional—the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply. FRT also targets an area of the body that a person would not 
reasonably expect to consider private.132  
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in Maryland v. King133 quoted Katz and 
proclaimed that “we have never held that merely taking a person’s photograph invades 
any recognized ‘expectation of privacy.’”134 In addition to the lawful taking of a 
photograph, the courts have recognized that identifying a person is also in line with the 
129 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
130 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 
131 Douglas A. Fretty, “Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth for Fourth Amendment 
Rights in Public Places,” Virginia Journal of Law & Technology 16, no. 3 (2011). http://www.vjolt.net/
vol16/issue3/v16i3_430-Fretty.pdf. 
132 Brown, “Anonymity,” 12. 
133 Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, (2013). 
134 Ibid. 
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constitution. This finding is evident in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court135 where the 
Supreme Court upheld the Nevada state law that required people to identify themselves to 
police officers upon request, even when the identification was not in the line of 
investigating a crime. This case is especially important when considering the 
advancement of technology in the future because Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion 
notes that the ability to attach a name to “a broad array of information about the person 
… can be tremendously useful in a criminal prosecution.”136 
B. SURVEILLANCE LEGALITY 
When faced with the question of FRT surveillance legality, advocates for the 
practice point to common traditions of police identification. For example, Dennis Bailey 
compares FRT surveillance to police identification through a mug-shot database: 
The great thing about a facial-recognition system is that a human being 
can verify the results. After a hit is made, a security officer can take the 
flagged individual aside and do a careful comparison with the picture in 
the database. This is no different from when a police officer pulls over a 
suspect and compares his or her face to the image on a printed copy of a 
mug shot.137 
John Woodward writes that facial recognition is a common technique used every 
day and is of no real concern. “One could argue that ‘facial recognition’ is a standard 
identification technique and that it raises no special concerns. After all, we look at each 
other’s faces to recognize one another. Police regularly use mug shots to identify 
criminals. And we think nothing of being asked to display ‘photo ID’ to confirm our 
identity.”138  
While Bailey’s and Woodward’s examples of common tactics for identification 
are technically correct, these tactics require a significantly longer time to make an 
135 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
136 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
137 Dennis Bailey, The Open Society Paradox: Why the 21st Century Calls for More Openness—Not 
Less (Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2004), 92. 
138 Woodward, John D. Jr. and Arroyo Center, Super Bowl Surveillance: Facing Up to 
Biometrics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2001), 3. 
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identification than FRT surveillance. Julie Petersen writes that the speed with which 
police can search mug shot databases is increasing as the technology develops:  
Law enforcement agencies…use many visual matching tools with online 
databanks, systems that are gradually superseding paper files, and books 
full of mug shots. Search and retrieval systems for accessing and sorting 
information stored in databases are becoming faster and more powerful.139 
Taking into account the advancement of technology, and the historically common 
techniques police use for identification, one might argue that FRT is simply a faster way 
of looking through a mug shot book. 
What Bailey and Woodward do not address in their examples is the potential for 
FRT, employed in a public place for surveillance, to capture the images of innocent 
people without their knowledge that are later potentially compared to a criminal database. 
Jennifer Lynch, of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, is a leading expert in facial 
recognition who has testified before Congress on the implications of government and 
private development of FRT. She writes: 
Some have…suggested the false-positive risk inherent in large facial 
recognition databases could result in…[altering] the traditional 
presumption of innocence in criminal cases by placing more of a burden 
on the defendant to show he is not who the system identifies him to be. 
And this is true even if a face recognition system such as NGI offers 
several results for a search instead of one, because each of the people 
identified could be brought in for questioning, even if he…was not 
involved in the crime. In light of this, German Federal Data Protection 
Commissioner Peter Schaar has noted that false positives in facial 
recognition systems pose a large problem for democratic societies: “in the 
event of a genuine hunt, [they] render innocent people suspects for a time, 
create a need for justification on their part, and make further checks by the 
authorities unavoidable.”140 
Even in the event that the government finds innocent people identified through 
surveillance, the relevant jurisprudence suggests that the situation is not a problem. In 
139 Julie K. Petersen, Understanding Surveillance Technologies: Spy Devices, Privacy, History & 
Applications (Boca Raton: Auerbach Publications, 2007), 483. 
140 Jennifer Lynch, “What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties,” 
Written Testimony of Jennifer Lynch, Staff Attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, July 18, 2012, 
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/jenniferlynch_eff-senate-testimony-face_recognition.pdf. 
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United States v. Mara,141 the court found that a grand jury can compel a person to supply 
writing or speech samples for comparison in an investigation, even if the person is not a 
suspect, because people commonly display those things in public. Similarly, in United 
States v. Dionisio,142 the court stated that “no person can have a reasonable expectation 
that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect 
that his face will be a mystery to the world.”143 While the courts did not examine these 
cases under the circumstances of a surveillance state, they demonstrated the courts’ 
position on the privacy, or lack thereof, of a person’s face in public.144 
Courts have also found, however, that people expect “not to be identified in 
public by sophisticated algorithms.”145 In Lopez v. United States146 the court specifically 
warned against new technology (in this case, a personal audio recording device) and the 
impact to privacy expectations: “the fantastic advances in the field of electronic 
communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual; that 
indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional 
questions.”147  
There is evidence that the American public in general does not approve of FRT 
surveillance. As discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, the Ybor City experiment not 
only showed that FRT was not technically ready for employment, but it showed that on a 
large scale, people did not want to be arbitrarily identified in public. At Super 
Bowl XXXV, in February 2002, police used FRT surveillance in order to identify 
criminals entering the event. The practice of employing FRT drew significant criticism, 
especially from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Although it was only five 
141 United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973). 
142 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). 
143 Ibid. 
144 Fretty, “Face-Recognition,” 18. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
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months since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, “the use of FRT at the Super Bowl was 
overwhelmingly negative.”148 The ACLU acted quickly:  
The response from privacy advocates was fast, furious, and predictable: 
The ACLU condemned the Super Bowl system…as the Snooper Bowl and 
asked the mayor and city council of Tampa, Fla. To hold public hearings 
on the topic. The ACLU argued that the public did not agree to be 
subjected to a computerized police lineup as a condition of admission.149 
The courts could interpret public outrage at privacy violations using FRT 
surveillance as inconsequential. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,150 the court 
determined that when technology is commonly available for public use, and the police 
only use it to enhance their natural abilities (not to see through walls or hear normally 
imperceptible conversations), the surveillance is constitutionally permitted.151 The courts 
have raised questions of whether FRT is a technology commonly available to the public 
and they have determined it is. Fretty writes that online programs such as Polar Rose and 
Google Profile are commonly available: “Members of the public could conceivably use 
an online FRT program such as Polar Rose to identify strangers on the street based on a 
furtively-snapped digital photo. Google is now building an application that would locate 
a person’s online Google Profile based on any photo of the person’s face.”152 
It appears the courts will continue to battle with the question of privacy 
expectations for individual identifications made using active surveillance. Justice 
Kozinski writes in his dissent in United States v. Pineda-Moreno,153 a phrase that, for its 
modernity and relevance to technology and privacy, may become a well-known and often 
cited reaction to FRT surveillance: “There is something creepy and un-American about 
such clandestine and underhanded [continuous surveillance]…We are taking a giant leap 
into the unknown, and the consequences for ourselves and our children may be dire and 
148 Fretty, “Face-Recognition,” 19. 
149 Glee Harrah Cady and Pat McGregor, Protect Your Digital Privacy: Survival Skills for the 
Information Age (Indianapolis: Que, 2002), 173–4. 
150 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
151 Fretty, “Face-Recognition,” 16–7. 
152 Ibid., 19. 
153 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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irreversible. Some day, soon, we may wake up and find we’re living in [Orwell’s] 
Oceania.”154 
C. NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 
Courts and legislators have contended with the issue of the government’s use of 
advancing technology and its effects on privacy security.155 In Olmstead, Justice Taft 
delivered the opinion of the court and noted that while there was not wording in the 
Fourth Amendment that provided protection against wiretaps, “discovery and invention 
have made it possible for the Government…to obtain disclosure in court of what is 
whispered in the closet.”156 Justice Taft also noted that a person inside their home, a 
privacy-protected area, who utters words over a line that projects the words to the outside 
of the home, expects those words to remain private, and Congress should pass direct 
legislation to protect them. Congress accommodated the courts in 1934, with the passage 
of the Federal Communications Act. Electronic surveillance was addressed in § 605, 
which stated that electronic communications were to be protected as private to the sender 
and recipient.157 
In 1968, in response to the limited protections of the Electronic Surveillance Act, 
Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Title III of the 
act regulated, “virtually all forms of electronic surveillance of conversations.”158 The Act 
sought to accommodate law enforcement in using new technology to combat crime, but 
also temper law enforcement efforts in a way that accommodated citizens’ reasonable 
privacy expectations.  
By 1986, Congress had amended Title III by enacting the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986. The intent of this amendment was to update Title 
III to clarify legislation for advancements in technology. Title III originally included only 
154 Ibid. 
155 Brown, “Anonymity,” 13. 
156 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
157 Turkington, Privacy Law, 294. 
158 Ibid., 295. 
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analog conversations, but the amendment governed, “the surveillance of digitally 
transmitted conversations, electronic mail, cellular phones, and pen registers.”159  
Despite the positive advancements made in legislation to protect privacy in the 
digital age while still allowing the government to conduct effective investigations, the 
courts continually face cases that challenge the constitutionality of developments in 
privacy-challenging technology. 
The court found, in 1983, that the use of technology to aide in searching, in this 
case a flashlight, did not violate the expectation of privacy when used for illuminating the 
interior of a car during a traffic stop.160 Additionally, in California v. Ciraolo,161 the 
court found that plain-view observation from an aircraft was not violative of Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections because any member of the public who was flying that 
day could have witnessed what the police saw, Ciraolo’s marijuana cultivation in the 
back yard.162  
More recently, Kyllo, discussed in Chapter I, has become the landmark case 
concerning the use of emerging technology to aid in searches. Justice Alito commented in 
Florida v. Jardines,163 that Kyllo was a “decision about the use of new technology.”164 
Justice Scalia, who wrote for the majority in Jardines, observed that Kyllo was “a case 
involving surveillance technology that allows law enforcement to learn details ‘that 
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.’”165 
The court also grappled with the place of technology, in relation to the Fourth 
Amendment and privacy, in United States v. Jones.166 There, the court found that when 
police placed a GPS device on the defendant’s vehicle for the purpose of tracking his 
159 Ibid., 296. 
160 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). 
161 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
162 Ibid. 
163 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013). 
164 Ibid. 
165 Brown, “Anonymity,” 13. 
166 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 
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movements, the move was violative of the Fourth Amendment because, police violated 
the trespass test when they placed the device. Some key reasoning came out of the case, 
however, because although Justice Scalia used the trespass test to judge the case, Justice 
Alito stated: 
Because GPS technology was relatively easy and cheap, it overcomes 
traditional practical constraints on close surveillance and…its use violated 
society’s expectation that law enforcement would and could not monitor 
all of an individual’s movements in his car for a 4-week period. While 
relatively short-term monitoring of an individual’s movements on public 
streets may be reasonable, “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”167 
Justice Alito’s last point comes from “mosaic theory,” which reasons the whole of 
surveillance activity is greater than the sum of its parts.168 Mosaic theory supposes that 
“the sequence of a person’s movements may reveal more than the individual movements 
of which it is composed.”169 When employing FRT surveillance—and considering the 
aggregation of information available about a person from the FBI’s NGI, or various open-
source information people post about themselves on the Internet, or information available 
from private companies—the government could establish a very nearly complete picture 
of the personal information and activities of unsuspecting people moving around in 
public. 
It appears the court is coming closer to determining the place for surveillance 
technology in privacy. The decision from Knotts in 1983, demonstrated that people can 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements on public streets, but it did 
not address the place of technology in that determination. Jones in 2012, however, 
considered the place of GPS tracking technology and the aggregation of information 
described by the mosaic theory. Kimberly Brown notes that Justices Sotomayor, Alito, 
Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan have all recently “expressed concern that modern 
167 United States v. Jones, Case Brief Summary, last modified November 30, 2013, 
http://www.casebriefsummary.com/united-states-v-jones/. 
168 Richard M. Thompson II, “United States v. Jones: GPS Monitoring, Property, and Privacy,” 
Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2012, 7. 
169 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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technology is eroding individuals’ ability to be free of government monitoring.”170 She 
quotes Justice Sotomayor’s concern: 
Electronic or other novel modes of surveillance can generate a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations—without any physical invasion of property. The 
government…can store and mine such data indefinitely. Because modern 
electronic surveillance is cheap by comparison to traditional surveillance 
techniques, it “proceeds surreptitiously” and “evades the ordinary checks 
that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: “limited police resources 
and community hostility.”171 
Although current laws in the United States do not prevent the government from 
employing technology like FRT surveillance, the courts are steadily moving toward a 
position that considers the place of technology in the realm of privacy expectations 
relating to the Fourth Amendment. Given the jurisprudence established by past courts, the 
privacy expectations of people in their activities and anonymity in public, and the 
advancement of technology that facilitates a mosaic of private information within 
seconds of searching, Congress should pass early legislation regulating the employment 
of FRT surveillance in the public.  
 
170 Brown, “Anonymity,” 14. 
171 Brown, “Anonymity,” 14. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has shown that facial recognition technology holds great opportunities 
for policing and government security by making mass surveillance more efficient. In 
mass surveillance, however, privacy pays the cost for surveillance efficiency. 
FRT has developed substantially in the past few decades, but it has had limited 
success in practical applications. By using advancing technology, researchers are quickly 
overcoming traditional technical problems they faced in the past. Research in the field of 
infrared imagery and three-dimensional image captures is advancing at a rapid pace and 
the commercial and security demand for FRT is growing.172 The advancement of FRT 
means that government and private security can identify people in public at a rate much 
more rapidly than traditional methods required.  
A sense of anonymity is important to people as they move about in public and 
interact within their community. The knowledge of active surveillance changes how 
people behave and can lead to moderately controlling behavior because people act 
differently when they know authorities are watching. In the same way that a stationary 
police car sitting overtly on the side of the interstate causes traffic to slow within eyeshot 
of the vehicle, overt surveillance, especially with the possibility of recognition, can serve 
to modify behavior on a massive scale.173 The perceived risk of apprehension modifies 
motorists’ behavior when they are within sight of the enforcer.174  
While the police are only modifying behavior in a small area while enforcing 
traffic laws, behavior modification on a large scale is a form of social control. People 
who know that authorities are watching them modify their behavior. This type of 
behavior modification is how prisons successfully employ the Panopticon to help ensure 
prisoners’ compliance to the rules. Even if the guards are not monitoring a prisoner, the 
172 Seong G. Kong, “Recent Advances in Visual and Infrared Face Recognition—A Review,” 
Computer Vision and Image Understanding 97, no. 1 (2005): 103–35, doi:10.1016/j.cviu.2004.04.001. 
173 David Shinar and A. James McKnight, “The Effects of Enforcement and Public Information on 
Compliance,” Human Behavior and Traffic Safety (1985): 385–419, doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-2173-6_17. 
174 Ibid. 
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prisoner has the illusion and sense of constant monitoring and thus their behaviors are 
modified so they conform to the rules.  
A. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Early interpretations of the Fourth Amendment have shown that the trespass test 
is no longer the sole means of identifying a breach of constitutionally protected privacy 
expectations. The courts have shown the important ability to reason with changing times 
and embracing technological change. The courts no longer take the words of the Fourth 
Amendment literally, but the spirit of the Amendment is what they debate. By employing 
the spirit of the Amendment, the courts have shown that privacy is connected to people, 
not places, and that a person should have no expectation of privacy in the things they 
thrust into the public eye. But what a person thrusts into the public eye is no longer just 
an anonymous face on the street. The advancement of technology has made a person’s 
face the passport to their identity. 
As noted in Chapter II, public identification and logging location data of 
individuals as they move about in public should be principally disturbing to people for 
whom the police have no particular reason for watching. Is identifying a person’s 
personal information, without a warrant, through public FRT surveillance, a violation of 
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure? This thesis has 
shown that it is not a violation, but that the courts are on the verge of a breakthrough for 
deciding whether privacy or security should weigh more heavily in the realm of 
advancing technology. Doug Fretty sums up the place of FRT in the privacy-versus-
security debate in his short conclusion: 
As innovations in digital surveillance have accelerated, fundamental 
uncertainties have emerged in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The fault 
lines of contemporary search-and-seizure law expose such questions as: 
whether we enjoy a reasonable expectation of anonymity in public, 
whether a person can be virtually “seized” by sophisticated technology 
that does not impede movement, and whether people truly cede privacy 
expectations in data revealed to ISPs. Face-recognition surveillance 
necessarily confronts each of these questions and more head-on, and, as a 
result, a constitutional challenge to this new technique may serve as a 
harbinger for the Fourth Amendment’s ambit in the digital era. Courts will 
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use the opportunity either to shore up the “right of the people to be 
secure,” or to admit how little the Amendment safeguards once we emerge 
from our homes.175 
People displaying their faces in public and moving about in public places can 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy according to early privacy jurisprudence, and 
current legislation and the Fourth Amendment do not expressly prohibit FRT-style 
surveillance as interpreted by the courts. However, the courts have shown a propensity to 
mature with technology and they are likely to decide soon whether or not people should 
have a right to keep their identity private in public places. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research in this area could combine First Amendment protections for 
anonymity with Fourth Amendment principles in the field of advancing technology to 
protect privacy and anonymity where FRT is employed. As publicly available data is 
widely collected by both private and public entities, massive searchable databases are 
available to identify patterns that are not available in a single source.176 Future research 
can identify jurisprudence for lawmakers to consider when drafting legislation for 
outdated privacy protection laws. 
C. REFLECTIONS 
This thesis sought to answer whether facial recognition surveillance violates 
Fourth Amendment privacy protections and to what extent, and whether law enforcement 
and government security professionals can use facial recognition surveillance for 
combatting crime while continuing to protect the public’s privacy expectations. The 
advancement of FRT technology was compared to the relevant topics and jurisprudence 
relating to privacy and it was determined that a person cannot assume their identity is 
protected when they show their face in public. 
Some 125 years ago, Warren and Brandeis pointed out that times are changing 
with evolving technology and society must be prepared to write and accept laws that 
175 Fretty, “Face-Recognition,” 45–6. 
176 Brown, “Anonymity,” 22. 
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account for societal and technological changes. Proper early legislation should precede 
massive employment of facial recognition technology, so Americans can explore the 
level of acceptable privacy manipulations they are willing to tolerate in exchange for 
security. 
Westin wrote that in order for people to accept unreasonableness for the purpose 
of greater security, the “very real and presently rising risk of jeopardizing the public’s 
confidence in its daily freedoms from unreasonable invasions of privacy,”177 must be 
serious enough to allow it. If the security enjoyed by our society is at such a risk that we 
are willing to unreasonably trade our privacy, we may also be trading our liberty—for 
when anonymity is destroyed, and the Panopticon is built, our behaviors are modified and 
social control is the result. As Justice Kozinski stated, continuous government 
surveillance is “creepy and un-American.”178 In order to maintain the values of privacy 
Americans expect, appropriate legislation is required. That legislation is on the horizon, 
but until then, privacy will lose in the face of surveillance. 
177 Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 370. 
178 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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